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SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONFOUNDS THE CRISIS
IN NURSING HOME CARE WITH AN UNNEEDED
JURISDICTIONAL CHANNELING REQUIREMENT
MARKO W. KIPA*
In Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care,' the United States
Supreme Court opined that an association of nursing homes (herein-
after "the Council") maintaining a constitutional challenge was re-
quired to present its claim to the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services before invoking federal question jurisdic-
tion.2 In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court overruled the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and admonished the appel-
late court's reliance on Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians'
and McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center.4 The Supreme Court relied on
its holdings in Weinberger v. Salfi5 and Heckler v. Ringer,6 finding those
cases barred a section 1331 suit antecedent to agency review. How-
ever, both of these cases were motivated, in part, by underlying claims
for benefits.7 The Council's claim was a "pure" constitutional claim,
an issue neither Salfi nor Ringer squarely addressed.' The Court also
found that the Council's claim fell within the ambit of the special ju-
risdictional channeling provision because it sought "to recover on any
* University of Maryland School of Law graduate 2002; Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy's Executive Editor 2001-2002.
1. 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
2. See id. at 2.
3. 476 U.S. 667 (1986). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had interpreted
the Supreme Court's holding in Michigan Academy to stand for the proposition that the
jurisdictional channeling requirement was limited to amount determinations. Illinois
Council on Long Term Care v. Shalala, 143 F.3d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998). However, the
Supreme Court sided with the Secretary's contention that Michigan Academy created an
exception which permitted federal question jurisdiction before agency review only when
judicial review would be completely foreclosed. Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 19.
4. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Haitian Refugee Center reaffirmed the reasoning behind Michigan Academy. Illinois Counci4
143 F.3d at 1075 ("reiterat[ing] its conclusion that section 1395ii does not affect regulatory
challenges that are detached from any request for reimbursement.").
5. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
6. 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
7. See infra note 36, 42.
8. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 34-36 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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claim arising under" the Medicare Act.9 The Court's holding can be
attributed to its interpretation of Johnson v. Robinson,'0 as well as its
implementation of certain principles of statutory construction. Under
Johnson, an analogy can be made that the Council's claim neither
arose under the Medicare Act, for it arose under the Constitution,"
nor did it seek "to recover on" as originally contemplated by section
405(h). Besides giving notice to the Secretary, there appears to be no
practical consideration for the Court's decision because the Secretary
will not rule on constitutional challenges.1" By according greater
weight to practical considerations, considering Johnson, adopting alter-
native interpretations of Ringer, Salfi, and Michigan Academy, and ad-
hering to the monetary connotation of the phrase "to recover on," the
Court could have reasonably allowed the Council's constitutional chal-
lenge to proceed without requiring it to present the claim to the
Secretary.
13
I. THE CASE
Under the Medicare Act Part A, nursing homes that provide care
for Medicare patients after a period in the hospital receive reimburse-
ments for their expenditures.14 This was not a self-executing provi-
sion, and in order to receive payment, nursing homes were obliged to
enter into an agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices and subject themselves to statutory and regulatory require-
ments.1 5 These requirements were enforced by federal and state
agencies that reported violations ("deficiencies") to the Secretary,
who in turn, imposed sanctions or remedies.' 6
In 1987, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act' 7 which imposed a stringent regulatory scheme and gave the Sec-
9. See id. at 5.
10. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
11. But cf Your Home Visiting Nurses Servs. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449 (1999) (relying on
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 615 (1984) ("Petitioners claim 'arises under' the Medicare
Act within the meaning of this provision because 'both the standing and the substantive
basis for the presentation' of the claim are the Medicare Act.")).
12. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1986).
13. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 44 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding that the Council
may invoke general federal question jurisdiction). It should also be noted that the author
concurs with Justice Thomas' statement in his dissent and also "express [es] no view on the
proper application of the ripeness doctrine to [the Council's] claim ... Id. at 51.
14. See Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 6.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, §§ 4201-4218, 101 Stat. 1330-160
to 1330-221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (1994 ed. and Supp. III)).
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retary broad discretion in imposing remedies. 8 The remedies were
broken down into three categories:
[1] Where, for example, deficiencies "immediately jeo-
pordize the health or safety of ... residents" the Secretary
must terminate the home's provider agreement or appoint
new, temporary management. [2] Where deficiencies are
less serious, the Secretary may impose lesser remedies, such
as civil penalties, transfer of residents, denial of some or all
payment, state monitoring and the like. [3] Where a nursing
home, though deficient in some respects, is in "substantial
compliance," i.e., where its deficiencies do no more than cre-
ate "a potential for causing minimal harm," the Secretary will
impose no sanction or remedy at all.19
The Illinois Council on Long Term Care was "an association of
approximately 200 nursing homes [that] participat[ed] in the Medi-
care (or Medicaid) programs."2° On behalf of the nursing homes, the
Council brought suit in federal district court because of an increase in
the number of nursing homes found to be in violation of the new
regulations. 2' Before the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act was
adopted, only six percent of all nursing homes were reprimanded for
failing to meet the Secretary's standards. 22 After the Act's adoption,
approximately seventy percent of nursing homes were found to be de-
ficient.23 The Council attributed this change to the vagueness and
increased discretionary aspects of the new rules.24  However, the
Council did not present its claim to the Secretary for a "final deci-
sion '25 before initiating the action in federal district court.26 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
district court did have jurisdiction over the claim. 27 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the Council
18. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 6.
19. Id. (explaining that the seriousness of a violation can vary depending on the defi-
ciency's prevalence, relation to other deficiencies, and past instances of similar violations).
20. Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 9.
21. See id. at 9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
22. See Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Shalala, 143 F.3d 1072, 1074 (7th Cir.
2000).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (explaining that judicial review in federal district court
may only be obtained following a "final decision" of the Secretary).
26. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 7-8.
27. See Illinois Counci 143 F.3d at 1077. The Court of Appeals nevertheless dismissed
the action because it also held that the Council's claim that the regulations were void for
vagueness was not ripe for review. Id.
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needed to present its constitutional claim to the Secretary before
bringing the action in federal district court.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Court's interpretation regarding special jurisdictional chan-
neling provisions took form in Johnson v. Robinson.29 In Johnson, the
Court narrowly construed the jurisdictional channeling provision of
the Veterans' Administration Act3° and concluded that it barred judi-
cial review of "questions of law or fact" that the Administrator resolved
"under" the statute.3" The Court then distinguished between "ques-
tions of law" and "questions of fact" and recognized that a constitu-
tional claim could not be brought under the statute, but only under
the United States Constitution. A constitutional claim challenged a
decision of Congress, not a decision of the Administrator. Thus, the
Court permitted the constitutional claim to be brought in federal dis-
trict court.
34
The following year, in Weinberger v. Salfi,35 the Court was con-
fronted with similar, albeit distinguishable circumstances: a claim that
arose under an Act as well as under the Constitution. 6 The Court
held that because the claim also arose under the Act, it must be chan-
neled through proper agency procedure.3 " Although the plaintiffs in-
itiated their action in the agency, the Secretary never issued a "final
28. See Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 9-10.
29. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
30. The Act provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veteran's Administration providing benefits for the veterans and
their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have the power or jurisdiction to review any
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
31. See Johnson, 415 U.S. at 367.
32. See id. relying on Robinson v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 853 (D. Mass. 1973) ("The
questions of law presented in these proceedings arise under the Constitution, not under
the statute whose validity is challenged.").
33. See Johnson, 415 U.S. at 367.
34. See id. at 373-74.
35. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
36. See id. at 750. A widow was unable to recover benefits for herself and her daughter
because they had failed to meet the duration-of-relationship requirement of nine months.
See id. at 754. Any constitutional claim would therefore have an underlying goal of recover-
ing benefits at some point in the future. See id. at 760 ("[It is fruitless to argue that this
section does not also arise under the Social Security Act.").
37. See id. at 760.
3 7
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decision." 8 The Court noted that a "final decision" was not necessary
since the Secretary could waive the requirement when "[the Secretary
was satisfied] that the only issue [was] the constitutionality of a statu-
tory requirement, a matter which [was] beyond his jurisdiction to de-
termine, and that the claim [was] neither otherwise invalid nor
cognizable under a different section of the Act."'39 Therefore, because
the action was initially presented to the agency and the Secretary
waived the "final decision" requirement, the plaintiffs were permitted
to pursue their action in federal district court.4 °
The Court was again confronted with a dual-purpose "benefits/
constitutional" claim in Heckler v. Ringer.4" Once again, the constitu-
tional claim was maintained for the purpose of being able to receive
benefits.42 Respondents brought suit in federal district court without
exhausting their administrative remedies.4 3 The Court noted that un-
like in Salfi, the Secretary did not waive the exhaustion requirement
and respondents could not circumvent additional agency adjudica-
tion.44 Accordingly, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the claim.45
In the landmark decision of Matthews v. Eldridge,46 the Court fo-
cused on the agency, rather than the district court, and it articulated
how due process should be analyzed in an administrative setting.47 It
noted that the fundamental requirement of due process is the "oppor-
38. Id. at 759 n.5. A nursing home is subject to judicial review "after any final decision
of the Secretary made after a hearing. .. " 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 (g).
39. Safi, 422 U.S. at 765; see also Matthew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976) (re-
affirming the principle articulated in Salfi that the Secretary may waive the "final decision"
requirement).
40. See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 767. It should be noted that although the Court sided with the
plaintiffs on the jurisdictional issue, the result was not as favorable as to the merits because
the Court found the Act to be constitutional. Id. at 785.
41. 466 U.S. 602 (1984). Respondents were individuals who were denied payment for a
surgical procedure known as bilateral carotid body resection (BCBR). See id. at 604. Al-
though for purposes of this paper the claim was characterized as dual-purpose, the Court
found "that whatever constitutional claims Respondents assert are too insubstantial to sup-
port subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. n.4.
42. See id. at 619. The Court classified the plaintiffs into two sub-groups: 1) those who
had already had the operation and were seeking retroactive benefits, and 2) those who had
not yet had the operation but would receive payment for the operation if the action was
successful. See id. at 613. Nevertheless, both groups were ultimately seeking some kind of
benefit under the Medicare Act. See id. at 616, 621.
43. See id. at 609-10.
44. See id. at 617.
45. See id. at 626.
46. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47. See id. at 332-35. Respondent had properly followed agency procedure and first
brought his claim before the Secretary. See id. at 328. However, following an unfavorable
initial determination, Respondent brought suit in federal district court. Id.
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tunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner."48 However, the Court emphasized that due process was a
flexible standard which employed procedural safeguards as the situa-
tion dictated.49 Financial cost alone would not constitute a due pro-
cess violation, but it was a factor that should be weighed.5 ° Hence,
administrative agencies were required to afford certain minimal safe-
guards before due process could be deemed satisfied.51
In Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,52 the Court dis-
tinguished between judicial review for amount determinations and ju-
dicial review for constitutional challenges.53 It began with "the strong
presumption that Congress intended judicial review of administrative
action" unless there was clear and convincing intent to withhold re-
view. 54 If there should be a substantial doubt as to Congressional in-
tent, "the general presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action is controlling. ' 55 The Court adhered to the
principles it had enunciated in United States v. Erika, 6 and analyzed
the language of the statutory text as well as its legislative history.57
The Court recognized that a claim for benefits would be reviewed by
the Secretary and judicial review was regulated by statutory promulga-
tions. 5' However, because a constitutional challenge was not consid-
ered by the Secretary in a fair hearing,59 a denial of judicial review
would completely foreclose any review of the Secretary's regulations.6 °
48. See id. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see also Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
49. See id. at 334; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
50. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 348.
51. See generally Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
52. 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 670-71; see also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 n.3
(1967) ("only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review").
55. Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 672 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,
467 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1984)).
56. 456 U.S. 201 (1982).
57. See Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 675 (relying on Erika, 456 U.S. at 210). However,
the Court also had to distinguish its holding in Erika to reach its conclusion that constitu-
tional claims were not barred. See id. In Erika, the Court relied on the Medicare statute's
precisely drawn provisions to find that an omission to authorize review as to a section of
amount determinations constituted deliberate intent to foreclose review of such claims.
456 U.S. at 208. In Michigan Academy, the Court stated that § 1395ff only dealt with amount
determinations, and therefore, Erika did not control because it was expected that the provi-
sion's narrowly drawn scope did not include constitutional claims. 476 U.S. at 675.
58. See Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 678.
59. See infra note 154.
60. See Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 678.
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Nevertheless, Michigan Academy explicitly addressed the "amount de-
terminations/constitutional challenge" dichotomy. Based on this dis-
tinction, there was no question in the Court's mind that "challenges
to the Secretary's instructions and regulations, [were] cognizable in
courts of law."6
1
Although the Court was dealing with an Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) statute62 in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,63
it nevertheless followed the precedent established in Michigan Academy
and held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear a constitu-
tional claim. 64 The Court distinguished between review of individual
denials of applications and review of the constitutionality of the INS's
review process. 65 The INS statute controlled the former, but not the
latter.66 The Court also analyzed the pertinent segment of the stat-
ute's language which referred only to review "of a determination re-
specting an application."67 The Haitian Refugee Center Court reached
the same conclusion as the Michigan Academy Court because the lan-
guage only encompassed a single act and did not preclude claims
based on the procedure of the INS.6" However, the Court took great
pains to dispel any contention that the constitutional claim was in any
way a "collateral" attack on an individual determination.69 Thus, the
constitutional claim as to the INS's regulations was allowed to proceed
because it did not fall within the ambit of the governing statute.7 °
61. Id. at 680. Unlike in Salfi and Ringer, the fact that there was not a "final decision" of
the Secretary was given little attention in Michigan Academy and the Court dismissed such a
requirement to a constitutional claim in a footnote. Id. n.8 (noting that a constitutional
attack on the regulation is not subject to a final decision requirement because the Secre-
tary could not provide a hearing or an administrative remedy).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e) (2000).
63. 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
64. See id. 498 U.S. at 496 ("[the] decision in this case is therefore supported by our
unanimous holding in [Michigan Academy]").
65. See id. at 488.
66. See id. at 492.
67. Id. 498 U.S. at 492; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e).
68. See Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. at 492. Congress could have expanded the reach
of the statute to encompass constitutional claims through the use of broader language. See
id. Other sections of the INS statute included language such as: 1) "all causes ... arising
under any of the provisions," or 2) "on all questions of law and fact." 8 U.S.C. § 1329
(2000); see also 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2000).
69. See Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. at 494-96. The Court distinguished the present
claim from the claim brought in Ringer. See id. at 495. In this case, respondents were not
seeking any redress from an individual determination, whereas in Ringer, the desired ulti-
mate outcome was reimbursement of benefits. See id. The outcome here would have no
effect on respondents' individual determinations, but would only allow the files to be re-
considered under the new regulations. See id.
70. See id. at 498-99.
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III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care,71 the United States
Supreme Court held that a constitutional challenge to the Secretary's
regulations could not be brought in district court under federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, but rather must proceed through a special review
channel.72 In order to accord full deference to the Court's reasoning,
a discernment of the relevant statutory provisions should occur. The
Medicare Act provides that a nursing home "dissatisfied ... with a de-
termination described in subsection (b) (2) . . .shall be entitled to a
hearing.., to the same extent as provided in section 405 (b) .. .and
to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as
is provided in section 405(g) .... ,", Judicial review may be sought in
federal district court regarding "any final decision of the [Secretary]
made after a hearing. . . ."" Section 405(h) provided:
No finding of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be re-
viewed by any person, tribunal of government agency except
as herein provided. No actions against the United States, the
[Secretary], or any officer or employee thereof shall be
brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on
any claim arising under this subchapter.
7 5
The United States Supreme Court first noted that under Salfi and
Ringer, the Council's claim would be barred.76 The Court reiterated
that in Salfi, it held that section 405(h) barred section 1331 jurisdic-
tion because the Social Security Act was the basis for the claim for
benefits as well as the constitutional claim.77 This did not connote
that there was a complete ban on constitutional claims, but rather that
constitutional claims must adhere to the same jurisdictional mandates
as claims for benefits.78 The Court also noted that in Ringer a constitu-
tional claim for future benefits must be channeled through the special
71. 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
72. See id. at 5.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(h)(1) (2000). Subsection (b)(2) gave the Secretary the power
to terminate an agreement with a nursing home if "the provider fails to comply substan-
tially with the provisions [of the Medicare Act]." 42 U.S.C. §1395(b) (2) (A); see also Illinois
Council, 529 U.S. at 8.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 (g) (2000) (emphasis added).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (emphasis added).
76. See Illinois Counci4 529 U.S. at 11.
77. See id.; see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975).
78. See Illinois Counci4 529 U.S. at 11; see also Salfi, 422 U.S. at 762.
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jurisdictional requirement.79 Thus, the Council could not find any
solace under Salfi and Ringer.
Next, the Court distinguished Haitian Refugee Center by simply stat-
ing that the case "turned on the different language of a different stat-
ute.""0 The Medicare Act's language of "arising under" was more
broadly structured than the INS statute's language of "of a determina-
tion respecting an application."81 The Court also distinguished El-
dridge, noting that federal question jurisdiction was permitted only
after Respondents brought their claim before the Secretary. 2 The
only aspect of the special jurisdictional channeling requirement the
Secretary could waive was the exhaustion of remedies, the "final deci-
sion."83 Therefore, Haitian Refugee Center and Eldridge did not support
the Council's position.
If the Council was going to prevail, its entire argument would
have to rest on the precedential value of Michigan Academy. 4 The
Court of Appeals had interpreted Michigan Academy as limiting the
scope of the special channeling provision to "amount determina-
tions.''85 However, the Supreme Court explained that the Michigan
Academy decision actually stated that it "would not pass on the mean-
ing of section 405 in the abstract."86 The Supreme Court read the
holding in Michigan Academy to create a narrow exception for constitu-
tional claims. Section 405 (h) would not be applied if the presenta-
tion of the claim to the agency would lead to no review at all.87 The
Supreme Court was not convinced that the Council would be com-
pletely denied judicial review. Hence, it held that the Council was not
79. See Illinois Counci4 529 U.S. at 12; see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614
(1984).
80. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 14.
81. See id.; see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 492 (1991).
82. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 15 (explaining that the requirement that an individ-
ual present a claim to the agency before raising it in court is non-waivable).
83. Id.
84. See id. ("the upshot is that without Michigan Academy the Council cannot win.").
85. Id.; see also Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Shalala, 143 F.3d 1072, 1075-76
(7th Cir. 1998).
86. Illinois Counci4 529 U.S. at 17; see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi-
cians, 476 U.S. 667, 680 (1986). The Court reasoned that any connotation limiting
§ 405(h) to amount determination would have overturned Salfi and Ringer and this is in-
consistent with the Court's procedure since it normally does not overturn or dramatically
limit its precedent sub silentio. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 17-18.
87. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 17; see also Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 681 n.12.
The Court found this to be the most plausible interpretation because it is consistent with
Michigan Academy's actual language, consistent with the precedent established in Ringer,
and consistent with the distinction between denial of review and postponement of review.
See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 19.
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permitted to circumvent the Medicare Act's jurisdictional channeling
requirement.
88
Justice Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion, in Illinois Council,
which Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens joined.89 However, both Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Stevens wrote separate dissenting opinions to
clarify their positions.9" Justice Stevens distinguished between claims
brought by patients and claims brought by providers.9' Justice Stevens
reasoned that the language of section 405(h) only encompasses pa-
tients,' not providers' challenges to the Secretary's regulation.92 Jus-
tice Stevens was also unpersuaded by the majority's "Pandora's Box"
rhetoric, noting that there was no indication that the courts would be
flooded with additional cases nor that the Court's decisions in Ringer
and Salfi would have to be overturned.93 On the other hand, Justice
Scalia noted that he did not believe that Michigan Academy was cor-
rectly decided, but since "it is on the books" it should be affirmed on
this occasion.94 Justice Scalia did not join Part III of Justice Thomas'
opinion because he was reluctant to use the phrase "presumption of
pre-enforcement review," arguing that it set too high a standard.95
Justice Thomas read Michigan Academy to stand for the proposi-
tion that section 405 (h), as incorporated by section 1395ii, was only
triggered as to individual amount determinations, not to the "chal-
leng[e] to the validity of the Secretary's instructions and regula-
tions."96 Prior to its decision in Michigan Academy, the Court did not
have the opportunity to squarely address section 1395ii.97 The Court's
unanimous decision in Michigan Academy noted that the provisions of
the Medicare Act "simply [did] not speak to challenges mounted
against the method by which amounts are to be determined."98 The
Council did not seek to resolve a dispute as to any particularized de-
88. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 21. The Court agreed that there would be some
individual hardship, but believed that these "inconveniences" were only examples of post-
ponement of judicial review. See id. at 23.
89. See id. at 32 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 31.
92. See id. (explaining that when a patient brings a claim, there are only two parties
involved, but when a provider brings a claim, three parties are involved).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 31-32.
95. See id. at 32 (stating that presumption "suggests that some unusually clear statement
is required by way of negation," and the phrase "reasonable implication" should be used in
its place). Id.
96. Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 33 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi-
cians, 476 U.S. 667, 680 (1986)).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 33 (citing Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 675).
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termination, but generally attacked the Secretary's method of inspec-
tion and enforcement.99 Justice Thomas also advocated adhering to
the presumption of pre-enforcement judicial review. 00 It did not
matter that there was only a postponement of judicial review; the pre-
sumption of pre-enforcement judicial review nevertheless existed, it
was just not as strong.' Justice Thomas also stated that the numer-
ous burdens imposed on nursing homes seeking judicial review could
be interpreted as a complete denial ofjudicial review. 102 Thus,Justice
Thomas would hold that section 405(h) does not hinder federal ques-
tion jurisdiction of constitutional claims to the Secretary's
regulations.1 0 3
WY. ANALYSIS
The text of the Medicare Act as well as its legislative history reveal
an ambiguity as to Congress' intent regarding the Act's enactment.
10 4
The third sentence of section 405(h), as applied to the Medicare Act
through section 1395ii, provides: "No action against the United States,
the Commissioner of Social Security or any other officer or employee
thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to re-
cover on any claim arising under this subchapter."10 5 When analyzing this
provision, the Supreme Court should have first referred to the hold-
ing in Erika; the Medicare Act must be construed in the context of its
narrowly drawn provisions.10 6 The Supreme Court also should have
referred to Haitian Refugee Center where the Court noted if Congress
had intended to limit review of constitutional claims "it could easily
99. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 37-39.
100. See id. at 43.
101. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 46 (relying on Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510
U.S. 200, 207 (1994) ("teaches only that the presumption is not as strong when the prob-
lem is one of delayed judicial review")); see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S.
479, 496 (1991) (applying the presumption even though plaintiffs had a post-enforcement
review option).
102. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 47-48 (noting that the prospect of termination of the
agreement, civil monetary fines, and posting of penalties on the Internet considerably de-
ter judicial review); Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. at 496-97 (explaining that the hardship
associated with presentment was "quite obviously ... tantamount to a complete denial of
judicial review for most undocumented aliens").
103. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 52.
104. See generally Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Shalala, 143 F.3d 1072 (7th Cir.
1998); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Heckler v.
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Weinberger v. Salfi, 466 U.S. 602 (1975); United States v.
Erika, 456 U.S. 201 (1982).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (emphasis added).
106. See Erika, 456 U.S. at 208 ("our lodestar is the language of the statute.").
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have used broader language." 107 Keeping these basic principles of
statutory construction in mind, the author turns to the Supreme
Court's analysis of the Medicare Act's text.
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of "to recover on any
claim arising under this subchapter" appears to encompass every im-
aginable claim whether constitutional or monetary. 1° 8 The Court er-
roneously interpreted Ringer and Salfi to reach its conclusion. The
Court recognized that in Salfi it partially relied on the plaintiffs re-
quest for relief to make clear that the action arose "under the act
whose benefits [were] sought."109 The Court attempted to down-play
this concession by noting that in Ringer it reached a similar result with-
out any request for benefits."' 0 However, regardless of the Court's
contention, Ringer was unequivocally based on benefits: "we hold to-
day that all [of the plaintiffs'] claims . . .are inextricably intertwined
with what we hold in essence a claim for benefits and that section
1331 jurisdiction over all their claims is barred by section 405. "111 The
Court was correct in noting that a claim for "future benefits" is a sec-
tion 405(h) claim and must be channeled through the agency.11 2
However, the Court cannot contend that after Ringer and Salfi it had
squarely addressed a "pure" constitutional claim with respect to sec-
tion 405(h). I'
107. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991). The statute analyzed
in Haitian Refugee Center contained slightly different language, but the analogous reasoning
was still applicable. In Illinois Council, the Supreme Court erroneously believed that section
405(h) contained the hypothetical ideal language articulated in Haitian Refugee Center. See
Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 14. However, there appears to be an irreconcilable difference
between "to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter" and the proffered phrases
"all causes... arising under any of the provisions [of the immigration statutes]" or "on all
questions of law and fact." See Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. at 494; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1329; 38 U.S.C. § 211(a).
108. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. 9-20.
109. Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 11-12 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761
(1975) (conceding that it had relied upon the fact that the plaintiff was seeking monetary
benefits to reach its holding)).
110. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 12.
111. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 624 (1984). The Court attempted to clarify its
position by stating that neither Ringer nor Salfi was predicated on a claim for benefits:
today we explicitly hold that our conclusion . . . is in no way affected by the fact that...
respondents did not seek an award of benefits." Id. at 623. But the Court was at least aware
of the underlying claim for benefits: "the fairest reading of the rather confusing amended
complaint is that all Respondents, including Ringer, wish both to invalidate the Secretary's
rule and her instructions to replace them with a new rule that allows [respondents] to get
payment for BCBR surgery." Id.
112. See Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 12; see also Ringer, 466 U.S. at 621.
113. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 36 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infta note 114 and
accompanying text.
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Rather than analogizing the Council's constitutional claim to the
claims brought in Salfi and in Ringer, the Supreme Court should have
referred to Michigan Academy, Johnson, and Haitian Refugee Center for
guidance. As mentioned above, both Salfi and Ringer had an underly-
ing claim for benefits; therefore, Illinois Council is factually dissimilar
to Salfi or Ringer."4 On the other hand, Michigan Academy, Johnson,
and Haitian Refugee Center were directly consistent with the Council's
claim because they dealt only with a constitutional claim."' Although
in Illinois Council the Majority dismissed this distinction, one cannot
ignore that a constitutional claim as to the Secretary's regulation
"arises under" the Constitution, not under the Medicare Act. In John-
son, the Court held that a constitutional challenge to the Veterans'
Readjustment Benefits Act was outside the scope of the statute. 1 6
The constitutional challenge was to a decision of Congress, not to an
individual determination of the Administrator. 117 In turn, the Coun-
cil's claim arose not out of a particular decision of the Secretary, but
dealt with Congress' passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act. A claim arising under the Medicare Act can only be based upon
an individual unfavorable determination by the Secretary. The rea-
soning in Johnson and Michigan Academy was re-affirmed in Haitian Ref-
ugee Center."' The Court allowed the constitutional action to proceed
under section 1331 because "[it attacked] the manner in which the
entire program [was] being implemented, allegations beyond the
scope of administrative review.""' 9 The only benefit of a favorable out-
come to the plaintiffs would have been the opportunity to have their
applications reconsidered under the new constitutional provision. 120
The same rationale applied in Illinois Council, the only benefit of a
favorable outcome would have been the opportunity to have their in-
spections conducted under the new constitutional Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act. These cases stand in direct contrast to the Su-
preme Court's holding in Illinois Council.
The Supreme Court refused to agree with the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeal's holding that Michigan Academy limited section
114. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761 (1975); see also Ringer, 466 U.S. at 624.
115. See Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 36 (2000) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see also Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 678; McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,
498 U.S. 479, 498 (1991).
116. SeeJohnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974).
117. See id.
118. See Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. at 498.
119. Id. at 488.
120. See id. at 495.
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405(h) to "amount determinations." 12' The Court did acknowledge
that Michigan Academy discussed the silence of section 405 (h) concern-
ing challenges to the Secretary's methodology. 122 The Court went on
to note that the Michigan Academy Court ultimately decided not to re-
solve the meaning of section 405(h) in the abstract.1 2' The Court be-
lieved that Michigan Academy provided an exception only in the
extreme instances when channeling review through the agency would
lead to no review at all. 12' Although this interpretation of Michigan
Academy may be correct, the question remains whether Michigan Acad-
emy, as well as Salfi and Ringer, correctly interpreted section 405(h).
The explicit language of the statute contains the phrase "to recover
on."12 5 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Illinois Council, "[the
Council's] challenge to the Secretary's regulations simply do not fall
within the 'to recover' language of section 405(h) that was obviously
drafted to describe pecuniary claims."' 2 6 Justice Thomas also took issue
with the majority's interpretation of Michigan Academy, which he rea-
soned established a distinction between "amount determinations" and
challenges to the Secretary's regulations.1 27 Under Justice Thomas'
view, a claim for benefits that is classified as "to recover on," falls
under section 405(h) and hence, triggers section 1395ii. 128 As articu-
lated in Erika, the statute should be considered in light of its narrowly
drawn provisions. 129 The phrase "to recover on" means to recover on.
The Court also noted in Haitian Refugee Center that if Congress in-
tended the statute to encompass constitutional challenges to the INS's
procedure, "it could easily have used broader statutory language. "130
Instead of using the language "to recover on any claim under this sub-
chapter," Congress could have used the language "all causes... aris-
ing under any of the provisions [of the Medicare Act]" or "[all causes]
121. Illinois Counci4 529 U.S. at 15; see also Illinois Council on Long Term Care v.
Shalala, 143 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1998).
122. See Illinois Council; 529 U.S. at 16; see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986).
123. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 17; see also Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 680.
124. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 17; see also Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 681.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
126. Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498
U.S. 479, 498 (1991) (relying on Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 675-76 (1986) ("[the court] recognized that the review of individual determinations
of the amount due on particular claims was foreclosed, but upheld the collateral attack on
the regulation itself, emphasizing the critical difference between an individual 'amount
determination' and a challenge to the procedure for making such a determination.")).
128. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 37-38.
129. See United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982).
130. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991).
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on all questions of law and fact.' 31 In light of the Medicare Act's
narrowly drawn provisions as well as Congress' discretion to use
broader language, a challenge to the Secretary's regulations should
not fall under the Medicare Act and should be permitted to be
brought in district court under section 1331.32
It is also plausible to argue that the Council had indeed satisfied
the three requirements of section 4 05 (g) to warrant judicial review.
Section 405(g) provides, in pertinent part: "Any individual, after any
final decision of the [Secretary] made after a hearing to which he was
"1133
a party ... may obtain review of such decision by civil action ...
Both the "final" and "made after a hearing" segments of section
40 5 (g) can be waived by the Secretary.13  In contrast, the "decision of
the Secretary" is nonwaivable and must be relinquished before attain-
ment of judicial review.1 35 However, the Secretary's "promulgation"
that she cannot and will not resolve constitutional challenges could be
construed as a decision on the Council's claim. In Ringer, the Secre-
tary's issuance of a regulation stating that all bilateral carotid body
resections (BCBR) are to be denied reimbursement should have con-
stituted a "decision."'3 6 This was an explicit denial of benefits: "By
issuing the challenged BCBR regulation, [the Secretary] decided that
BCBR can in no event be reimbursable."1 37 If Ringer pursued a claim
for the BCBR operation, the decision on his claim would have been
predetermined.13 Once again, the crux of the argument in Illinois
Council reverts to the Secretary's jurisdictional incapacity to resolve
constitutional claims.1 39 Just as in Ringer, the Secretary's statement is
the practical equivalent of "a decision" on the Council's claim. If the
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g).
134. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 638 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (relying on Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 764-767 (1975)).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id. ("If that is not a 'decision of the Secretary,' [Justice Stevens] does not know
what is"). As Justice Stevens also articulated, the majority incorrectly referred to the
nonwaivable requirement as "presenting a claim for reimbursement" to the Secretary. Id.
n.27. The majority's reliance on this statement is not only linguistically defunct, but also
undercuts their position that the phrase "to recover on" is not limited to claims for bene-
fits. See id.
138. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 639-40 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
139. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. 667, 676 (1986). Section 12016 of the
Medicare Carrier's Manual provides:
The HO [Hearing Officer] may not overrule the provisions of law or interpret
them in a way different than the HCFA [Health Care Financing Administration]
does when he disagrees with their intent; nor may he use hearing decisions as a
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Council had filed the claim in the agency, the decision was already
predetermined. 4 ° Hence, it is not unrealistic to contend that the
Council satisfied the waivable and nonwaivable pre-requisites of sec-
tion 405(g) and is therefore entitled to judicial review pursuant to
federal question jurisdiction.
Although the Council may not fulfill the Supreme Court's Michi-
gan Academy exception of complete denial of judicial review, 41 the
Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that the Council did not fulfill
the Haitian Refugee Center standard of "[a] practical equivalent of a
total denial ofjudicial review."' 42 Although simply channeling the ac-
tion through the agency may indeed only produce a postponement of
judicial review, this was not the only repercussion. t4 3 If the nursing
home did not submit a corrective plan and subsequently correct the
deficiency, it risked termination of the agreement.1 4 4 In essence, the
Council would have to abide by the mandates of the contested statute
before it could bring suit challenging the statute. If the "damage has
already been done," what incentive does the nursing home have to
maintain its action?1 45 On the other hand, if the nursing home brings
suit without making the corrections, its agreement with the Secretary
rests entirely with "leniency that is solely a matter of grace of the
Secretary." 1
4 6
Moreover, another of the Secretary's options for enforcement
stands as a deterrent to judicial action: "civil penalties which accrue
for each day of non-compliance. 1 47 There are also numerous intangi-
ble repercussions which deter judicial action while promoting compli-
vehicle for commenting upon the legality, constitutional or otherwise, of any pro-
vision of the Act or regulations relevant to the Medicare Program.
Medicare Carrier's Manual §12016 (1985). Although the Secretary's statement in regard
to Ringer's claim was stipulated in district court, the Secretary's statement about constitu-
tional challenges was derived from her own procedural manual and is indicative of its
draconian application.
140. See infra note 154.
141. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 20.
142. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 497 (1991); see also Illinois Council
529 U.S. at 20.
143. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 48-52 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 49.
145. See id. at 47 (relying on Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial
Review, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 85, 104 (1997) ("for when the costs of 'presenting' a claim via the
delayed route exceed the costs of simply complying with the regulation, the regulated en-
tity will buckle under and comply, even when the regulation is plainly invalid.")).
146. Illinois Council 529 U.S. at 49 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 31).
147. Id. (relying on Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908) ("[T]o impose upon a party
interested the burden of obtaining judicial decision ... only upon the condition that if
unsuccessful he must . . . pay fines . . .is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the
courts.")).
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
ance: the deficiency is made available to residents of the nursing
home as well as the general public and the deficiency is posted on the
Internet. 148 Finally, although the financial burden that the nursing
homes accrue cannot alone entail a due process violation, it is one
factor which should be considered in conjunction with the other
repercussions.' 49 Therefore, these deterrents guarantee minimal as-
sertion of judicial review, are tantamount to the practical foreclosure
ofjudicial review,150 and ensure that any success will only amount to a
pyrrhic victory.
The Supreme Court found comfort in the fact that the Secretary
may waive some of the requirements to ease the burden, including the
exhaustion requirement when further exhaustion would be futile. 5'
However, in Matthews, the Court recognized that in special circum-
stances, "deference to the Secretary's conclusion that as to the utility
of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always
appropriate."'1 52 Although the presentation of the claim to the Secre-
tary is a nonwaivable requirement, 1 53 the Secretary has repeatedly ac-
knowledged that the agency cannot and will not render a decision on
constitutional claims to its regulations.' 54 The Secretary's acknowl-
edgment is strengthened through historical consensus that adjudica-
tion of constitutional claims has been beyond the power of
administrative agencies. 155 In Matthews, the Supreme Court made
clear that the fundamental principles of due process entailed "the op-
portunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner."' 56 The Secretary cannot maintain that the Council will be given
148. See Illinois Counci 529 U.S. at 49-50.
149. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
150. See supra note 146.
151. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618 (1984); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,
765-67 (1975); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1976).
152. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 618 (relying on Matthews, 424 U.S. at 330-32).
153. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 328 ("the nonwaivable element is the requirement that a
claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary.").
154. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1986)
("as the Secretary has made clear, 'the legality, constitutional or otherwise, of any provision
of the Act or regulations relevant to the Medicare Program' is not considered in a 'fair
hearing' held by a carrier to resolve a grievance . . .").
155. SeeJohnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (finding that the Board of Veter-
ans' Appeals expressly disclaimed authority to decide constitutional questions); see also Salfi
(relying on Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) ("adjudication of
the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the
jurisdiction of administrative agencies")); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)
("Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing
procedures . . .").
156. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). In Matthews, the
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an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Even if the
Council had brought the suit to the agency, the agency would not
have been able to offer a resolution.1 57 The agency would simply have
provided the Council with input that was already known to all: that the
agency cannot and will not render a decision on constitutional
claims.158 This was exactly the position taken by Justice Breyer, writ-
ing for the majority, in Illinois Council. Justice Breyer disregarded the
capacity of the agency to provide meaningful adjudication because it
was the "action" which had to be channeled for agency review.' 59
It is apparent that the Court also did not take into consideration
the time period between the request for a hearing before an adminis-
trative law judge and a decision on a claim before mandating that the
"action" be initially presented to the Secretary. In Matthews, the Court
noted that in 1976 the delay was approximately ten months. 6 ° Thus,
it appears that an individual with a constitutional claim will have to
request a hearing with the agency and wait for a response (whatever
time period that might be) informing him that the agency will not be
able to resolve his claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The varying interpretations of Congress' intent regarding the spe-
cial jurisdictional channeling provision have lead at best to ambiguous
conclusions. 1 6 1 Despite the plethora of rhetoric demonstrating the fu-
tility of agency review of constitutional challenges, 62 a major procedu-
ral hurdle nevertheless exists: the initial presentation of the claim to
Court enunciated that the degree of potential deprivation is a factor to be considered
when analyzing due process. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 341. The factual circumstances sur-
rounding the Matthews decision are slightly more draconian than the facts at hand. While
the Council's claim addressed the implications of requiring constitutional claims to be
submitted to the Secretary, Eldridge's claim sought to re-institute his disability payments,
presumably his only source of income. See id. at 325. However, this factual discrepancy
does not undermine the underlying basis of the argument: meaningful review cannot be
obtained where the arbitor cannot resolve the issue.
157. See supra note 154.
158. See id.
159. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 23.
160. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 341- 42. The ten months waiting period was a generous
approximation. If an individual first seeks a reconsideration hearing, the total time period
will be in excess of one year. Id.
161. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 787 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
question involves complicated questions of legislative intent and a statutory provision, 42
U.S.C. § 405(h), which has baffled district courts and courts of appeals for years . . .").
162. See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 794; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 627-647 (1984) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675-76
(1986); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 484 (1991).
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the Secretary is a non-waivable requirement. 161 Congress' intent as to
this aspect is explicit and the Secretary is not delegated any discretion
in this matter. It is incumbent upon Congress to recognize that the
presentation of a constitutional claim to the Secretary has outlived any
practical consideration. The adjudicative process for constitutional
challenges should commence in the judiciary. For instance, following
the decision in this case, the Council will in all likelihood present its
claim to the Secretary, who will, in turn, after a period of considera-
tion waive the exhaustion requirement. The action will then once
again reappear at the district court level. This issue could easily have
been resolved the first time around. However, the rationale support-
ing the channeling of claims for benefits to the Secretary still exists; it
allows the agency the opportunity to resolve these relatively minor
claims without judicial intervention, while simultaneously keeping
these claims from "clogging" the court system. By recognizing this
distinction, Congress could implement a modified jurisdictional chan-
neling provision which efficiently and fairly accounts for the concerns
of the Secretary as well as the claimant.164 Accordingly, thejudiciary is
not responsible for bringing about this change, and if a change is to
occur, it would have to come from Congress itself.165
163. See Illinois Council, 529 U.S. at 24 ("at a minimum, however, the matter must be
presented to the agency prior to review in federal court.").
164. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 639 (1984) (relying on Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 330 (1976). The Court recognized that a claimant's interests during a hearing
are not effectively advanced because it is unlikely that the Secretary would change the
entire regulatory scheme simply at the request a of single claimant. Id. On the other
hand, the Secretary's stated interests include:
[P]reventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency
may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own
errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and ex-
pertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.
Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765. Because the Secretary has stated that she will not consider a constitu-
tional claim in hearing, supra note 154, none of the Secretary's aforementioned interests
are advanced by the channeling provision.
165. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (rely-
ing on TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) ("The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom
of... policy choices and resolving the struggle between non-competing views of the public
interest are not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such responsibility in the political
branches.'")); See also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 156 (1992) ("Congress, of
course, is free to design or require an appropriate administrative procedure..."); Ringer,
466 U.S. at 627 ("if the balance is to be struck anew, the decision must come from Con-
gress and not from this Court.").
